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I. INTRODUCTION 
Awaiting Acceptance: You have just made an offer to sell fifty 
sofas to a furniture store.  The store manager says he will 
e-mail his acceptance later that day.  Your e-mail system’s 
third-party spam filter, which inspects messages before 
they enter your system, is somewhat overactive.  Through 
no fault of the store manager, the filter deletes the 
message and you never see it.1 
 
Rotten Recall: A television company is conducting a 
voluntary recall of one of its most popular models.  The 
company sends you an e-mail recall notice.  In order to 
ensure that the notice will reach as few customers as 
possible, the company intentionally doctors the e-mail to 
include large fonts and colorful text.  The e-mail enters 
your system and your spam filter intercepts it.  The e-mail 
is routed to your junk mail folder and you never see it.2 
 
Flower Fanatic: You are a member of a flower gardening 
interest group called “flowers-r-us.”  Members send 
gardening tips to each other through e-mail.  These 
messages say “flowers-r-us” in the subject line.  Since you 
receive numerous “flowers-r-us” e-mails each day, you 
create a rule on your computer to route all such e-mails to 
a “gardening” folder, which you check infrequently.  One 
day, you see an interesting tip on how to care for 
hydrangeas, and you forward the e-mail to a business 
associate.  The associate replies, “Great article!  By the 
way, I’ve attached a new offer for the contract we’ve been 
working on.”  Since “flowers-r-us” is still included in the 
subject line, the reply e-mail gets routed to the gardening 
folder and you never read it.3 
 
The Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA) defines 
when an electronic message is “sent” and “received.”4  However, 
 
 1.  See Dean N. Alterman, Guess What Your Spam Filter Just Bought for You, 
PORTLAND BUS. J. (Apr. 4, 2004, 9:00 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/portland 
/stories/2004/04/05/focus5. 
 2.  See Cem Kaner, SPAM, Filtering, and Commercial Legislation, CEM KANER, 
J.D., PH.D. (May 1, 2003, 5:53 AM), http://kaner.com/?p=25. 
 3.  This hypothetical is adapted from an interview with Michael J. McGuire, 
Chief Info. Sec. Officer, Littler Mendelson, in St. Paul, Minn. (Sept. 10, 2012). 
 4.  See UETA § 15(a), (b) (1999). 
2
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several issues emerge upon application of these definitions to 
situations like the hypotheticals above.5  Is a message received if it is 
intercepted by an overactive filter, or is the sender out of luck?  
Does it matter whether the recipient’s spam filter is located inside 
or outside of the recipient’s server?  Should it matter who manages 
the recipient’s spam filter—the recipient, the system manager, or a 
third-party contractor?  Does a recipient have recourse when a 
message is intercepted by a spam filter due to the sender’s 
negligent or sharp practices?  One court has suggested a draconian 
solution: 
In defending their failure to [acknowledge the court’s e-
mail notice], the appellants offer nothing but an updated 
version of the classic “my dog ate my homework” line. . . .  
Imperfect technology may make a better scapegoat than 
the family dog in today’s world, but not so here.  Their 
counsel’s effort at explanation, even taken at face value, is 
plainly unacceptable.6 
This note, however, will argue that the solution is not so cut-
and-dry.  Part II will briefly chronicle the rise of electronic 
communication and the laws that govern it and will highlight the 
similarities and differences between the laws’ definitions of “send” 
and “receive.”7  Part III will review the development of spam filters 
and illustrate the uncertainties that arise when spam filters interact 
with UETA’s definitions of “send” and “receive.”8 
Part IV will explore three partial and concurrent solutions to 
the spam filter issue: (1) a rebuttable presumption that a properly 
sent record is received, (2) use of the consumer-protection 
provision in the Electronic Signatures in Global and National 
Commerce Act (E-SIGN) to provide insulation from sharp business 
practices, and (3) a test that allocates responsibility to both sender 
and recipient according to the factors that each party controls.9  
The note will conclude by arguing that, since both sender and 
recipient benefit from the use of electronic communication, both 
parties should share the responsibility of preventing messages from 
being intercepted by spam filters.10 
 
 5.  See generally Thomas J. Smedinghoff, Electronic Document Delivery and the 
Problem of Spam Filters, 4 PRIVACY & SECURITY L. REP. 301 (2005). 
 6.  Fox v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 389 F.3d 1291, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
 7.  See infra Part II. 
 8.  See infra Part III. 
 9.  See infra Part IV. 
 10.  See infra Part V. 
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II. HISTORY OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION LAWS 
A. Rise in Electronic Communication 
In the late 1960s, businesses began to develop electronic data 
interchange (EDI), which allowed them to communicate 
electronically with standardized purchase orders, invoices, and 
other documents.11  This new technology resulted in fewer 
transmission errors, lowered transaction costs, better customer 
service, and improved cash flow.12  By 1991, EDI was used by 15,000 
companies worldwide.13  As EDI fundamentally changed the way 
contracts for the sale of goods were entered into and performed, 
proponents realized that existing law (including common law and 
the UCC) potentially made those electronic documents legally 
unenforceable.14 
The ABA Electronic Messaging Services Task Force wrote the 
EDI Model Trading Partners Agreement (“EDI Model Agreement”) 
to dispel these concerns.15  The EDI Model Agreement sought to 
“assur[e] the validity and predictability of the related commercial 
[EDI] transactions” and included the first definition of an 
electronic writing.16  Drafters knew, however, that the EDI Model 
Agreement was only a “first step” and recommended “the 
development of an ongoing comprehensive strategy to accomplish 
appropriate legal reform.”17 
The earliest electronic communication laws in the United 
States diverged widely at the state level.18  Some state statutes were 
technology-specific, while others were media-neutral; some were 
narrow in scope, while others were broad.19  Some states combined 
these approaches while others did nothing at all.20  A sharp rise in 
 
 11.  Elec. Messaging Servs. Task Force, Am. Bar Ass’n., The Commercial Use of 
Electronic Data Interchange—A Report and Model Trading Partner Agreement, 45 BUS. 
LAW. 1645, 1649 (1990); Christina L. Kunz, The Definitional Hub of E-commerce: 
“Record,” 45 IDAHO L. REV. 399, 401 (1999). 
 12.  Kunz, supra note 11, at 401. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Elec. Messaging Servs. Task Force, Am. Bar Ass’n., supra note 11, at 1649–
50. 
 15.  See generally id. 
 16.  Kunz, supra note 11, at 403–04. 
 17.  Elec. Messaging Servs. Task Force, Am. Bar Ass’n., supra note 11, at 1647. 
 18.  See Robert A. Wittie & Jane K. Winn, Electronic Records and Signatures Under 
the Federal E-SIGN Legislation and the UETA, 56 BUS. LAW. 293, 294–96 (2000). 
 19.  Id. at 295–96. 
 20.  Id. 
4
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the use of electronic communication, combined with the lack of 
uniformity in state statutes, created the need for uniform laws to 
facilitate and encourage electronic commerce, validate electronic 
transactions, and foster uniformity.21 
 
B. Scope of Electronic Communication Laws 
The following chart briefly summarizes the scope and 
adoption of the relevant electronic communication laws that have 
been drafted since 1996: the U.N. Model Law on Electronic 
Commerce (“Model Law”), UETA, the Uniform Computer 
Information Transactions Act (UCITA), E-SIGN, and the U.N. 
Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in 























 21.  See UETA § 6; UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE WITH 
GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, at 30, U.N. Doc. A/51/162, U.N. Sales No. E.99.V.4 (1999) 
[hereinafter UNCITRAL]. 
 22.  For more information, see 2 IAN C. BALLON, E-COMMERCE AND INTERNET 
LAW § 15.01 (2d ed. 2011); DOCUMENTING E-COMMERCE TRANSACTIONS §§ 2:2, 3:2, 
4:1 (William A. Hancock ed., 2011). 
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Each electronic communication law defines what “writings” are 
within its scope.  UETA defines a “record” as “information that is 
inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or 
other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.”30  An 
“electronic record” is “a record created, generated, sent, 
communicated, received, or stored by electronic means.”31  This 
definition is nearly identical to those found in the Model Law, 
 
 23.  NCCUSL is now known as the Uniform Law Commission (ULC). 
 24.  UNCITRAL, supra note 21, at 16–17. 
 25.  See UETA Refs. & Annots. (West, Westlaw through 2011 annual 
meetings) (excluding Illinois, New York, and Washington). 
 26.  BALLON, supra note 22, § 15.03[1].  Four states have enacted statutes to 
prevent UCITA from governing a contract entered into by their citizens.  See id. 
 27.  Ratification has been limited.  See Status 2005—United Nations Convention 
on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts,                         
UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/electronic 
_commerce/2005Convention_status.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2013). 
 28.  Such agreements are determined by context and should be broadly 
construed (e.g., ordering goods online or including an e-mail address on a 
business card).  UETA § 5(b), cmt. 4 (1999). 
 29.  Congress intends for E-SIGN to apply broadly.  Adam R. Smart, E-SIGN 
Versus State Electronic Signature Laws: The Electronic Statutory Battleground, 5 N.C. 
BANKING INST. 485, 492 n.46 (2001). 
 30.  UETA § 2(13). 
 31.  Id. § 2(7). 
6
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UCITA, E-SIGN, and the Convention.32  It intends to encompass all 
types of electronic information, including those arising from 
“foreseeable technical developments.”33  Similarly, the laws 
consistently define an “information processing system” as “an 
electronic system for creating, generating, sending, receiving, 
storing, displaying, or processing information.”34 
C. Relevant Provisions of Electronic Communication Laws 
The main thrust of the electronic communication laws 
discussed above is that an electronic record or signature may not be 
denied legal effect solely because it is in an electronic form.35  In 
other words, the difference between an electronic and paper 
record is irrelevant in judging the legal validity of a document.36  
The laws also provide requirements regarding accuracy of an 
original document,37 attribution,38 and retention capability.39  They 
do not, however, require electronic records to be used,40 nor do 
they establish the legal validity of an electronic record41—that 
 
 32.  See 15 U.S.C. § 7006(4) (2006) (defining “electronic record”); United 
Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International 
Contracts, G.A. Res. 60/21, art. 4(c), U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/21 (Nov. 23, 2005) 
[hereinafter Convention] (defining “data message”); Model Law on Electronic 
Commerce, G.A. Res. 51/162, art. 2(a), U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/162 (Dec. 16, 1996) 
[hereinafter Model Law] (same); UCITA § 102(a)(26), (55) (2002) (defining 
“electronic” and “record”). 
 33.  See UNCITRAL, supra note 21, at 23–24, 26. 
 34.  UETA § 2(11); see Convention, supra note 32, art. 4(f) (defining 
“information system”); Model Law, supra note 32, art. 2(f) (same); UCITA 
§ 102(36) (2002) (defining “information processing system”).  Although E-SIGN 
does not provide a definition of “system,” UETA’s definition applies in states that 
have enacted UETA.  See infra text accompanying notes 58–60. 
 35.  See 15 U.S.C. § 7001(a); Convention, supra note 32, art. 8, para. 1; Model 
Law, supra note 32, art. 5; UCITA § 107; UETA § 7. 
 36.  UETA § 7 cmt. 1; see also U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, UNITED 
NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE USE OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS IN 
INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS, at 47, U.N. Doc. A/Res/60/21, U.N. Sales No. 
E.07.V.2 (2007) [hereinafter UNCITRAL] (“[E]lectronic communications [will] 
achieve the same degree of legal certainty as paper-based communications.”). 
 37.  15 U.S.C. § 7001(d)(1); Model Law, supra note 32, art. 8; UETA § 12(a). 
 38.  Model Law, supra note 32, art. 13; UETA § 9. 
 39.  15 U.S.C. § 7001(d); Model Law, supra note 32, art. 10; UETA § 12. 
 40.  15 U.S.C. § 7001(b)(2); UNCITRAL, supra note 21, at 30 (“[T]he Model 
Law . . . should not be construed in any way as imposing [the use of electronic 
means of communication].”); UETA § 5(a). 
 41.  UETA Refs. & Annots. Prefatory Note B (West, Westlaw through 2011 
annual meetings); UNCITRAL, supra note 21, at 32; see BALLON, supra note 22, 
§ 15.02[2][A] (“[E-SIGN] generally does not alter substantive contract law.”). 
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determination is left to the applicable area of substantive law.42 
The electronic communication laws also define when 
electronic records are sent and received.43  UETA provides: 
(a) [A]n electronic record is sent when it: 
(1) is addressed properly or otherwise directed properly 
to an information processing system that the recipient has 
designated or uses for the purpose of receiving electronic 
records or information of the type sent and from which 
the recipient is able to retrieve the electronic record; 
(2) is in a form capable of being processed by that system; 
and 
(3) enters an information processing system outside the 
control of the sender . . . or enters a region of the 
information processing system designated or used by the 
recipient which is under the control of the recipient.44 
A message is addressed or directed properly to a recipient 
when there is “specific information which will direct the record to 
the intended recipient.”45  Subsection (a)(3) provides that an 
electronic record is sent when it leaves the sender’s system or, if the 
message never leaves the sender’s system, when the record is under 
the recipient’s control (i.e., when the record is received).46 
The UETA definition of “receipt” is essentially a subset of its 
definition of “sent” because a received message has necessarily 
been sent.47  It provides: 
(b) [A]n electronic record is received when: 
(1) it enters an information processing system that the 
recipient has designated or uses for the purpose of 
 
 42.  UETA employs a “minimalist approach” to ensure solely that electronic 
records are “treated in the same manner . . . as written records.”  UETA Refs. & 
Annots. Prefatory Note (Westlaw).  Similarly, the goal of the Model Law is to 
create a “media-neutral environment.”  UNCITRAL, supra note 21, at 17. 
 43.  See Model Law, supra note 32, art. 15; UETA § 15.  These provisions may 
be varied by agreement.  See Model Law, supra note 32, art. 15 (stating that the 
definition applies “[u]nless otherwise agreed”); UETA § 15 (same). 
 44.  UETA § 15(a); see also Convention, supra note 32, art. 10, para. 1 
(defining “dispatch”); Model Law, supra note 32, art. 15, para. 1 (same). 
 45.  UETA § 15 cmt. 2.  This definition covers mass mailings but not “general 
broadcast message[s], sent to systems rather than individuals . . . .”  Id. 
 46.  Id. § 15(a)(3) & cmt. 2.  For example, employees of the same university 
or corporation may share the same system.  Id. § 15 cmt. 2.  In such a situation, 
sending and receipt are simultaneous.  UNCITRAL, supra note 21, at 55. 
 47.  R. David Whitaker, An Overview of Some Rules and Principles for Delivering 
Consumer Disclosures Electronically, 7 N.C. BANKING INST. 11, 21 (2003); see UETA 
§ 15(a), (b). 
8
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receiving electronic records or information of the type 
sent and from which the recipient is able to retrieve the 
electronic record; and 
(2) it is in a form capable of being processed by that 
system. . . . 
. . . . 
(e) An electronic record is received . . . even if no 
individual is aware of its receipt.48 
Subsection (b)(1) defines receipt as the time that an 
electronic record is capable of being retrieved, as opposed to when 
the message is accessible or actually viewed.49  If receipt were 
otherwise defined, a recipient could effectively block receipt by not 
accessing or viewing the record.50  Additionally, it is impractical for 
the sender to prove not only that a record was received but that it 
was also accessed or viewed.51  Since e-mail protocol cannot provide 
automatic acknowledgment of receipt,52 such proof would require a 
recipient’s manual acknowledgment, which the recipient could 
easily falsify (and could require acknowledgment of the 
acknowledgment, etc.).53 
Subsection (e) notes that an electronic record may be received 
before the recipient has read it or even knows of its existence.54  Up 
until the 1999 NCCUSL Annual Meeting, the UETA draft also 
 
 48.  UETA § 15(b), (e); see also Model Law, supra note 32, art. 15, para. 2 
(defining “receipt”). 
 49.  UETA § 15(b)(1); see Elec. Messaging Servs. Task Force, Am. Bar Ass’n., 
supra note 11, at 1732 (stating that a message is received under the EDI Model 
Agreement when it is “accessible to the receiving party”). 
 50.  See Richard A. Lord, A Primer on Electronic Contracting and Transactions in 
North Carolina, 30 CAMPBELL L. REV. 7, 62 (2007) (“[T]he recipient is foreclosed 
from arguing that he did not receive the information simply because he did not 
access it . . . .”); cf. Henk Snijders, The Moment of Effectiveness of E-mail Notices, in E-
COMMERCE LAW 79, 80 (Henk Snijders & Stephen Weatherill eds., 2003) (arguing 
in favor of a receipt rule similar to that in UETA). 
 51.  Snijders, supra note 50, at 80. 
 52.  Telephone Interview with Michael Fleming, Senior Corporate Counsel, 
Cray, Inc. (Sept. 21, 2012).  The current standard e-mail protocol, RFC-5321, is 
based on an e-mail protocol written in 1989.  Id.; see Simple Mail Transfer Protocol, 
INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE (Oct. 2008), http://tools.ietf.org/html 
/rfc5321. 
 53.  Telephone Interview with Michael Fleming, supra note 52; cf. CHRISTINA 
L. KUNZ & CAROL L. CHOMSKY, CONTRACTS: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 343 (2010) 
(discussing the same concept regarding the mailbox rule).  The EDI Model 
Agreement does require verification of receipt.  Elec. Messaging Servs. Task Force, 
Am. Bar Ass’n., supra note 11, at 1667. 
 54.  UETA § 15 cmt. 5.  The paper equivalent is an unread letter in a 
mailbox.  Id. 
9
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stated that an electronic record was effective upon receipt, rejecting 
the common law mailbox rule.55  Although UCITA retains this 
provision,56 the UETA Drafting Committee decided not to alter 
substantive contract law in an effort to preserve media neutrality 
and avoid bad policy.57 
While E-SIGN does not contain sending and receiving rules, 
UETA’s definitions still apply in states where it is enacted.58  E-SIGN 
does not preempt UETA when a state enacts the official version of 
UETA or enacts a similar law that is consistent with E-SIGN and 
does not grant preferred status to a certain technology used for 
creating electronic records.59  If the state-enacted legislation is 
exempted from preemption and E-SIGN does not contain a 
comparable provision, then the UETA provision applies.60  
Therefore, UETA’s send and receipt rules apply, notwithstanding 
E-SIGN, in states that have enacted the official UETA or a similar 
law.61 
The 2005 Convention modifies the definition of “receipt” in 
two ways.62  Unlike UETA and the Model Law, which define receipt 
as the time that the record enters the recipient’s system, a record is 
not received under the Convention until it is “capable of being 
retrieved by the [recipient].”63  However, UNCITRAL did not 
intend this language to demonstrate a modification from the 
 
 55.  NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, DRAFT FOR 
APPROVAL: UNIFORM ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS ACT § 114(e) & n.5 (1999), 
available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/electronic%20transactions 
/etaam.pdf. 
 56.  See UCITA § 214(a), cmt. 2 (2002) (“Subsection (a) . . . reject[s] the 
mailbox rule for electronic messages . . . .”). 
 57.  Amelia H. Boss, The Uniform Electronic Transactions Act in a Global 
Environment, 37 IDAHO L. REV. 275, 335 (2001). 
 58.  See 15 U.S.C. § 7002(a) (2006). 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  See id. (allowing state law to “modify, limit, or supersede” E-SIGN); Shea 
C. Meehan & D. Benjamin Beard, What Hath Congress Wrought: E-sign, the UETA, 
and the Question of Preemption, 37 IDAHO L. REV. 389, 406 (2001) (“[W]here the 
UETA has provisions with no analog in E-sign . . . , the UETA will apply.”). 
 61.  A state enactment of UETA likely need not be a “pristine” version of the 
official UETA in order to be exempted from preemption.  See Meehan & Beard, 
supra note 60, at 403–04 (finding that a requirement of a pristine adoption could 
cause “absurd results”). 
 62.  See Convention, supra note 32, art. 10. 
 63.  Id. art. 10, para. 2.  Compare Model Law, supra note 32, art. 15, para. 2 
(enters a “designated information system”), and UETA § 15(b)(1) (1999) (enters 
an “information processing system”), with Convention, supra note 32, art. 10, para. 
2.  The time at which an electronic record is capable of retrieval is “left for the 
applicable law.”  UNCITRAL, supra note 36, at 61. 
10
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Model Law receipt requirements.64  The Convention also includes a 
presumption that a record is “capable of being retrieved by the 
[recipient] when it reaches the [recipient]’s electronic address.”65  
This presumption “may be rebutted by evidence showing that the 
[recipient] had in fact no means of retrieving the 
communication.”66 
III. SPAM FILTERS AND THEIR INTERACTION WITH UETA 
A. Spam—Definition and Early Prevention Efforts 
Spam is most broadly defined as “[u]nsolicited commercial e-
mail.”67  In November 2012, an estimated sixty-three percent of e-
mail was spam.68  There are three types of spam: messages sent by 
legitimate marketers who are concerned with customer privacy, 
messages that “employ quasi-legal methods” to recruit as many 
customers as possible, and “traditional” spam sent by malicious 
software that converts computers into “botnets” to relay potentially 
harmful messages.69 
In an effort to curb the disruption caused by spam, as well as 
its toll on the economy,70 Congress enacted the Controlling the 
 
 64.  See UNCITRAL, supra note 36, at 61–62 (“[T]he rules on receipt of 
electronic [records] in the . . . Convention [are] consistent with article 15 of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law . . . .”). 
 65.  Convention, supra note 32, art. 10, para. 2.  There is no substantive 
difference between “electronic address” and “information system.”  UNCITRAL, 
supra note 36, at 62. 
 66.  UNCITRAL, supra note 36, at 62 (citation omitted).  In 2009, the ULC 
considered amending UETA to mirror the Convention’s presumption 
requirement.  See Henry D. Gabriel & D. Benjamin Beard, 2009 Annual Meeting 
Report, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION 2 (May 29, 2009), http://www.uniformlaws.org 
/Committee.aspx?title=UN%20E-Commerce%20Convention (follow “2009 
Annual Meeting Report, Exhibit D” hyperlink).  Instead, the ULC urged Congress 
to ratify the Convention (which Congress has not done).  Id. at 1 (follow “2009 
Annual Meeting Report” hyperlink). 
 67.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1524 (9th ed. 2009); see also David Lorentz, The 
Effectiveness of Litigation Under the CAN-SPAM Act, 30 REV. LITIG. 559, 562 (2011) 
(“[N]either the courts nor any secondary sources have provided a consistent 
definition of ‘spam.’”). 
 68.  Darya Gudkova, Spam in November 2012, SECURELIST (Dec. 19, 2012), 
http://www.securelist.com/en/analysis/204792258. 
 69.  See Lorentz, supra note 67, at 564–67; Kara Rowland, Clever Spammers Stay 
‘One Step Ahead’ of Law, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2006, at A1. 
 70.  See Jonathan Krim, Spam’s Cost to Business Escalates; Bulk E-mail Threatens 
Communication Arteries, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2003, at A1 (estimating that spam 
would cost U.S. organizations over $10 billion in 2003). 
11
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Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act (“CAN-
SPAM Act”) in 2003.71  Among its goals were to reduce the amount 
of spam received in inboxes, increase the convenience of e-mail 
communication, discourage the sending of “vulgar” materials, and 
prevent spammers from misleading spam recipients.72  The CAN-
SPAM Act prohibits the sending of false, misleading, or deceptive 
information;73 requires the inclusion of a functioning return e-mail 
address;74 and requires the sender to provide an opportunity for 
the recipient to “opt-out” of receiving future messages.75  It is 
unclear as to whether the CAN-SPAM Act has effected a decrease in 
the amount of spam received by e-mail users.76  Some critics argue 
that, while the Act successfully curbs the spamming practices of 
“legitimate” companies, those companies make up only a small 
percentage of the spamming population.77  Others contend that 
Congress’s intent was to “legalize legitimate, unsolicited e-
marketing” rather than decrease the amount of spam received.78  
Regardless, spam has continued to pose a major threat to e-mail 
security and e-commerce.79 
B. Advent of Spam Filters 
An excessive amount of spam, coupled with the lack of 
effective legislation, necessitated the creation of spam filtering 
programs.80  In general, a spam filter reduces the amount of spam 
received by filtering out messages that appear to be spam.81  When 
 
 71.  15 U.S.C. §§ 7701–13 (2006). 
 72.  Id. § 7701. 
 73.  Id. § 7704(a)(1), (2). 
 74.  Id. § 7704(a)(3). 
 75.  Id. § 7704(a)(5). 
 76.  Compare FED. TRADE COMM’N, EFFECTIVENESS AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE 
CAN-SPAM ACT 7 (2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/canspam05 
/051220canspamrpt.pdf (noting a decrease in spam), with John Soma et al., Spam 
Still Pays: The Failure of the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003 and Proposed Legal Solutions, 45 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 165, 165 (2008) (noting an increase in spam). 
 77.  Rowland, supra note 69. 
 78.  Lorentz, supra note 67, at 576; see also Matthew E. Shames, Note, Congress 
Opts Out of Canning Spam, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 385, 403 (2004) (noting that Congress 
did not want to restrict all spam, as e-mail “is an inexpensive way for businesses to 
advertise their products” (quoting 149 CONG. REC. S13,125 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 
2003) (statement of Sen. Feingold))). 
 79.  See Smedinghoff, supra note 5 (“[S]pam . . . threatens to render e-mail 
useless as a means of communication.”). 
 80.  See id. (“One very promising solution is spam filtering.”). 
 81.  See L. Elizabeth Bowles et al., Am. Bar Ass’n, Program Materials: 
12
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a filter identifies a message as spam, it deletes the message or 
“quarantines” it into a junk mail folder.82  Spam filters typically 
block messages based on the sender’s domain name (e.g., 
“@wmitchell.edu”) and the message’s content.83 
Spam filters block e-mails sent from specific domain names by 
relying on realtime blackhole lists (RBLs).84  RBLs are maintained 
by third-party list generators, who can be either for-profit 
companies or “good Samaritans.”85  When the RBL generator 
suspects a domain name of sending spam, the domain is 
“blacklisted” by inclusion on the RBL.  Additionally, some RBL 
generators maintain a list of server relays that spammers frequently 
use.86  Spam filters purchase RBLs and block the domains and 
servers included on the lists.87 
Although RBLs greatly reduce the amount of spam that ends 
up in a user’s inbox, they may block legitimate e-mails as well.88  
Since the lists are compiled in part from individual complaints, 
RBLs can be inaccurate.89  An RBL can blacklist a domain merely 
because the domain’s server allows spamming activity.90  Further, a 
legitimate domain may have difficulty getting removed from the list 
and may have to pay a fee.91 
Second, spam filters examine a message’s content by searching 
for phrases, words, and layouts that “look[] like spam.”92  Each 
 
Technological Controls on Spam and Their Legal Implications, LARKIN HOFFMAN 5 (Apr. 
2005), http://www.larkinhoffman.com/files/OTHER/47.pdf. 
 82.  Smedinghoff, supra note 5. 
 83.  See How Does the Spam Filter Work?, U. PENN. ENGINEERING, http://www.seas 
.upenn.edu/cets/answers/spamblock-filter.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2013). 
 84.  Id.  For more information on RBLs, see SPAMHAUS, http://www.spamhaus 
.org (last visited Feb. 20, 2013). 
 85.  Interview with Michael J. McGuire, supra note 3. 
 86.  Carla Schroder, Realtime Black-Hole Lists: Heroic Spam Fighters or Crazed 
Vigilantes?, ENTERPRISE NETWORKING PLANET (Feb. 24, 2003), http://www 
.enterprisenetworkingplanet.com/netsysm/article.php/1594561/. 
 87.  A small minority of spam filters instead use “whitelists,” which allow e-
mail only from the domains included on the list.  Bowles et al., supra note 81, at 7.  
This method results in fewer spam messages but requires significant upkeep on 
the part of the recipient to keep the whitelist current.  Id. 
 88.  See Schroder, supra note 86 (demonstrating that a spam-friendly server 
can result in the blocking of all domains using that server). 
 89.  Bowles et al., supra note 81, at 6. 
 90.  See Schroder, supra note 86 (asserting that some RBLs block “both 
spammers and open relays”). 
 91.  See Bowles et al., supra note 81, at 6; see also SBL Delisting Procedure, 
SPAMHAUS, http://www.spamhaus.org/sbl/delistingprocedure/ (last visited Feb. 
20, 2013) (outlining procedures for removal from a Spamhaus RBL). 
 92.  How Does the Spam Filter Work?, supra note 83.  For example, the filter may 
13
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instance of an irregular word or phrase increases the message’s 
“spam score.”93  Once the score is high enough, the message is 
filtered.94  Like RBLs, content filters may be influenced by users.95 
Content filters require a great deal of upkeep.96  Spamming 
trends change over time to reflect world events, so the words and 
phrases used in spam will change accordingly.97  In addition, a 
spammer will frequently change her approach in an attempt to 
“beat” the spam filter.98  Due to the specific advantages and 
disadvantages of RBL and content filters, most spam filters use a 
combination of domain-based and content-based blockers.99 
A message is likely to pass through numerous filters on its 
journey from sender to recipient.100  First, the sender’s system may 
filter the message to protect against outbound spam and to prevent 
the release of sensitive information.101  Next, the message will likely 
pass through several “relay” servers, each of which may have its own 
filter system.102  Upon arrival at the recipient’s system, a message 
may pass through a filter maintained by the system manager or by a 
third-party agent of the manager.103  These filters may be located 
outside or within the recipient’s system.104  Finally, the recipient’s 
individual workstation is likely to apply a final round of filters.105 
Despite attempts to intercept only illegitimate or harmful 
 
search for words like “Viagra” or layouts such as large fonts and blinking lights.  Id. 
 93.  Bowles et al., supra note 81, at 8–9.  For an example of the various tests 
employed by spam filters, see What Headers Are Added to E-mails That Are Scanned by 
SpamAssassin?, LAMP HOST, http://www.lamphost.com/node/82 (last visited Feb. 
20, 2013). 
 94.  Bowles et al., supra note 81, at 9. 
 95.  See, e.g., So Much Time, So Little Spam, GOOGLE, http://mail.google.com 
/intl/ar/mail/help/fightspam/spamexplained.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) 
(“When the Gmail community . . . report[s] a particular email as spam, our 
system . . . block[s] similar messages.”). 
 96.  See Bowles et al., supra note 81, at 10 (“The rules need to be constantly 
updated . . . .”). 
 97.  See Gudkova, supra note 68 (noting that, in November 2012, a 
considerable amount of spam referenced Hurricane Sandy and the upcoming 
holiday season). 
 98.  See Rowland, supra note 69 (noting that spammers have learned how to 
“throw off filter keyword searches”). 
 99.  See Bowles et al., supra note 81, at 6, 8–10 (noting the advantages and 
disadvantages of each filtering method). 
 100.  Interview with Michael J. McGuire, supra note 3. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Id. 
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messages, spam filters nevertheless intercept some legitimate 
messages as well.  In an informal survey conducted by the author,106 
twenty-five percent of respondents found one or more personal e-
mails (i.e., a message intended for the recipient alone) in their 
junk e-mail folder.  Eighty-one percent of respondents found one 
or more commercial e-mail (i.e., a mass-produced e-mail sent to 
many recipients) to which they had subscribed.107 
C. Interaction Between Spam Filters and UETA 
Spam filters were not on the radar of the UETA Drafting 
Committee.108  Although spam is believed to have been invented in 
the mid-1990s,109 it did not become a major concern until the mid-
2000s.110  Consequently, UETA was drafted and enacted without 
attention to spam filters, and the interaction between UETA and 
spam filters has become a source of contention among experts in 
electronic communication laws and among states that have enacted 
UETA.111  Businesses have been forced to accept the deluge of spam 
 
 106.  Survey questions are available at Spam and Junk Mail Survey, 
SURVEYMONKEY, http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/9HDHCGG (last visited Feb. 
20, 2013). 
 107.  Respondents reported that 5% of the e-mails in the junk mail folder were 
personal e-mails, 32% were commercial e-mails, and 62% were spam. 
 108.  Telephone Interview with D. Benjamin Beard, Reporter, UETA Drafting 
Comm. (Sept. 14, 2012); Telephone Interview with Thomas J. Smedinghoff, Am. 
Bar Ass’n Advisor, UETA Drafting Comm. (asserting that the Committee was more 
concerned with the “time and place” of delivery than the “fact” of delivery).  But 
see Kaner, supra note 2 (asserting that the Committee did consider spam filters). 
 109.  Credence E. Fogo, The Postman Always Rings 4,000 Times: New Approaches 
to Curb Spam, 18 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 915, 915–16 (2000) (claiming 
that spam was invented by two lawyers seeking to advertise their services). 
 110.  Jonathan Krim, FTC Files Suit Against Sender of Porn ‘Spam,’ WASH. POST, 
Apr. 18, 2003, at E1 (noting that spam represented 8% of all e-mail traffic in 2001 
and 40% in 2003). 
 111.  See, e.g., Assembly Comm. on Judiciary, AB 328 Bill Analysis, CAL. LEGIS. 
INFO. 8 (May 5, 2009), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/asm/ab_0301    
-0350/ab_328_cfa_20090504_125946_asm_comm.html (opposing a bill that would 
allow insurance companies to send notifications electronically); Smedinghoff, 
supra note 5 (“If . . . the message is quarantined or deleted by a spam filter, has the 
sender failed to . . . deliver information, or has the recipient assumed the risk?”); 
Soma et al., supra note 76, at 169 (“When legitimate e-mails are accidentally 
filtered, potentially important communications are lost.”); Bowles et al., supra note 
81, at 5 (“[T]he fact that legitimate e-mail may be blocked by these increasingly 
effective filters . . . mean[s] that your life . . . promises to become a lot more 
uncertain . . . .”); Gail Hillebrand, Uniform Electronic Transactions Act: Consumer 
Nightmare or Opportunity?, CONSUMERS UNION (Aug. 23, 1999), 
http://www.consumersunion.org/finance/899nclcwc.htm (“A message is received 
15
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or install spam filters, knowing that some legitimate e-mail will 
likely be blocked as well.112  These issues are likely to become more 
significant as e-commerce continues to develop because more 
communication will come under the purview of UETA.113 
The growing use of new technologies, such as messaging 
through cell phones and social networks, makes spam filter issues 
an even more pressing concern.114  These technologies are quickly 
replacing e-mail as the preferred method of communication,115 but 
they lack the relative stability of e-mail systems.116  While most e-mail 
servers retain a copy of e-mails that enter or leave the system,117 
most cell phone carriers do not retain text message content.118  
Although carriers do retain text message details (such as the name 
of the sender and the date and time of dispatch), some new 
messaging systems—such as Apple’s iMessage—circumvent the 
carriers, making documentation even more uncertain.119  
Spammers have already become more active in soliciting cell phone 
users.120  As spam filters become more commonplace in new 
technologies,121 they will likely encounter many of the same issues 
that currently exist with e-mail; therefore, the interaction between 
 
even . . . when the message was automatically discarded by a junk mail filter.”). 
 112.  See Filters Cut Off E-mail That Businesses Want, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2004), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2004/feb/22/20040222-103456-4989r/ 
(“Many companies forgo paying for filters to block unwanted e-mail, fearing that 
legitimate messages will be blocked.”). 
 113.  See UETA § 5(b) (1999); see also supra note 28 & accompanying text. 
 114.  See UETA § 2 cmt. 4 (advocating an expansive definition of “electronic” 
so that UETA “will be applied broadly as new technologies develop”). 
 115.  See Sarah Radwanick, The 2010 U.S. Digital Year in Review, COMSCORE 10–
11, 28 (Feb. 7, 2011), http://www.comscore.com/Press_Events/Presentations 
_Whitepapers/2011/2010_US_Digital_Year_in_Review (follow “Download 
Whitepaper” hyperlink) (noting a decrease in e-mail use and an increase in 
messaging through social network and text message use in most age groups). 
 116.  Interview with Michael J. McGuire, supra note 3. 
 117.  See IMAP & POP, U. MINN., http://www.oit.umn.edu/email/imap                      
-pop/index.htm (last modified June 11, 2012) (demonstrating that modern e-mail 
systems retain copies of messages on the server unless deleted by the recipient). 
 118.  See Retention Periods of Major Cellular Service Providers,                               
A.C.L.U., http://www.aclu.org/cell-phone-location-tracking-request-response-cell                 
-phone-company-data-retention-chart (last visited Feb. 20, 2013). 
 119.  See Jenna Wortham, Free Texts Pose Threat to Carriers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 
2011, at B1. 
 120.  See Nicole Perlroth, Spam Invades a Last Refuge, the Cellphone, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 8, 2012, at A1 (noting a steep rise in text message spamming since 2009). 
 121.  See Eric A. Taub, Eluding a Barrage of Spam Text Messages, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
5, 2012, at A9 (presenting a variety of spam filter tools provided by cell phone 
carriers). 
16
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UETA and new technologies may pose an even greater problem 
than the current e-mail issues. 
IV. SOLUTIONS FOR DETERMINING IF A RECORD HAS BEEN RECEIVED 
This section will explore three partial and concurrent 
solutions for determining whether a filtered electronic record has 
been sent and received: (1) a rebuttable presumption that a 
message is received when it is properly sent or when it enters the 
recipient’s system,122 (2) use of the consumer protection provisions 
in E-SIGN,123 and (3) a test that accounts for the sender’s and 
recipient’s ability to prevent a spam filter from intercepting an 
electronic record.124 
A. Rebuttable Presumption of Receipt 
1. Presumption in General 
Presumption of receipt of paper mail has long existed in 
American common law.125  Courts universally hold that a letter that 
is properly directed and dispatched is presumed to have been 
received by the recipient.126  Rather than a “conclusive presumption 
of law,” the presumption is an “inference of fact” that the postal 
service will properly deliver the letter.127  Consequently, the 
presumption may be rebutted by evidence that the letter was not 
received, and the factfinder makes the final determination by 
weighing the evidence brought by the sender and recipient.128 
The policy underlying the presumption of receipt is addressed 
 
 122.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 123.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 124.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 125.  E.g., Rosenthal v. Walker, 111 U.S. 185, 193–94 (1884); Grade v. 
Mariposa Cnty., 64 P. 117, 117–18 (Cal. 1901); Pitts v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. 
Co., 34 A. 95, 97 (Conn. 1895); Hamilton v. Stewart, 34 S.E. 123, 125 (Ga. 1899); 
Ashley Wire Co. v. Ill. Steel Co., 45 N.E. 410, 413 (Ill. 1896); Huntley v. Whittier, 
105 Mass. 391, 392–93 (1870); Plath v. Minn. Farmers’ Mut. Fire Ins. Ass’n, 23 
Minn. 479, 484–85 (1877); Austin v. Holland, 69 N.Y. 571, 576 (1877). 
 126.  E.g., Rosenthal, 11 U.S. at 193; accord Pitts, 34 A. at 97; Hamilton, 34 S.E. at 
125; Huntley, 105 Mass. at 392; Austin, 69 N.Y. at 576.  While the presumption is 
often referred to as the “mailbox rule,” this author refrains from that term so as to 
avoid confusion with the mailbox rule as applied to acceptance of an offer.  See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 63 (1981) (“[A]n acceptance . . . is 
operative . . . as soon as put out of the offeree’s possession . . . .”). 
 127.  Rosenthal, 11 U.S. at 193; Huntley, 105 Mass. at 392–93. 
 128.  Rosenthal, 11 U.S. at 193–94; Huntley, 105 Mass. at 392–93. 
17
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in Ashley Wire Co. v. Illinois Steel Co.: 
The presumption that the letter was received is founded 
upon the regularity and certainty with which the mail is 
carried and delivered.  When letters are properly stamped 
and addressed, the uniformity with which they are 
received is such that the failure to receive such letter is a 
very unusual circumstance . . . .129 
The presumption is further strengthened by the fact that postal 
workers “are charged by law with the proper delivery of the mail, 
and are presumed to have performed those duties in a proper 
manner.”130 
Courts have generally held that a positive and uncontradicted 
denial of receipt is sufficient for a factfinder to determine that a 
presumption of receipt has been rebutted.131  However, courts tend 
to support a presumption of receipt when the recipient’s rebuttal is 
less than a categorical denial of receipt132 or when the sender 
contradicts the rebuttal with evidence that the letter likely was 
received.133  Regardless of whether the presumption of receipt is 
met or rebutted, most courts hold that the burden of proving 
receipt remains with the sender.134 
Presumption of receipt of e-mails has not been applied as 
uniformly and universally as it has for paper mail.135  On one hand, 
the Eighth Circuit has held that the presumption should apply to 
“other forms of communication—such as . . . electronic mail . . . —
 
 129.  Ashley, 45 N.E. at 413. 
 130.  Smedinghoff, supra note 5. 
 131.  See, e.g., Planters’ Mut. Ins. Ass’n v. Green, 80 S.W. 151, 151 (Ark. 1904); 
Grade v. Mariposa Cnty., 64 P. 117, 118 (Cal. 1901); Hill v. Wiles, 92 A. 996, 996–
97 (Me. 1915).  But see In re Alexander’s, Inc., 176 B.R. 715, 721 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
1995) (“[T]he addressee must do more than simply deny that it received notice.”).  
A line of Georgia cases has held that an uncontradicted denial of receipt by the 
recipient may overcome the presumption as a matter of law.  See, e.g., Hamilton, 34 
S.E. at 125. 
 132.  See, e.g., W.E. Richmond & Co. v. Sec. Nat’l Bank, 64 S.W.2d 863, 869 
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1933) (holding the presumption not overcome when the 
recipient does not remember whether he received the letter or when another 
company member may have received it). 
 133.  See, e.g., Jensen v. McCorkell, 26 A. 366, 367 (Pa. 1893) (finding that the 
presence of the sender’s return address strengthened the presumption of receipt). 
 134.  Huntley v. Whittier, 105 Mass. 391, 392–93 (1870) (“[T]he burden of 
proving . . . receipt remains throughout upon the party who asserts it.”); see also 
Travelers’ Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn. v. Farmers’ Mut. Fire Ins. Ass’n of Monona 
Cnty., 233 N.W. 153, 156 (Iowa 1930) (“[T]he burden of [proving receipt] is 
nevertheless upon the [sender].”). 
 135.  BALLON, supra note 22, § 14.05[3]. 
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provided they are accepted as generally reliable . . . .”136  When 
determining whether the presumption was properly rebutted, 
courts have considered whether the notice was intercepted by a 
spam filter,137 sent improperly due to a computer glitch,138 or 
accessed on a different computer,139 as well as whether the sender 
received a “bounce-back” message140 or the recipient has 
demonstrated a “lack of diligence.”141 
However, this line of cases has been limited solely to 
presuming receipt of notice of an electronic court filing (ECF).142  
Thus far, courts have not determined whether a presumption of 
receipt exists for other e-mail and messaging systems.143  Even if a 
court recognizes a presumption of receipt, it may require different 
types of proof than those required for paper mail.144 
2. Disadvantages of a Rebuttable Presumption of Receipt 
Two different presumptions have been suggested as a solution 
to the interaction between spam filters and UETA’s definition of 
“send” and “receive.”  The “strong” presumption is that an 
electronic record should be presumed received when it is properly 
sent.145  The “weak” presumption is that a record should be 
 
 136.  Am. Boat Co. v. Unknown Sunken Barge (Am. Boat Co. I), 418 F.3d 910, 
914 (8th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). 
 137.  Am. Boat Co. v. Unknown Sunken Barge (Am. Boat Co. II), 567 F.3d 348, 
353 (8th Cir. 2009); see also Pace v. AIG, Inc., No. 8 C 945, 2010 WL 4530357, at *1, 
*3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 1, 2010) (finding “excusable neglect” due in part to spam filter 
excuse); In re Philbert, 340 B.R. 886, 890 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2006) (rejecting spam 
filter excuse); Tobin v. Granite Gaming Grp. II, L.L.C., No. 2:07-CV-577-BES-PAL, 
2008 WL 723337, at *10 (D. Nev. Mar. 17, 2008) (same). 
 138.  Am. Boat Co. II, 567 F.3d at 353. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  See Pace, 2010 WL 4530357, at *2 (“Unlike here, the cases cited . . . 
involve situations where an attorney’s malfunctioning e-mail is just one example of 
the attorney’s overall lack of diligence.”). 
 142.  See Am. Boat Co. I, 418 F.3d 910, 914 (8th Cir. 2005); Dempster v. 
Dempster, 404 F. Supp. 2d 445, 449 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 143.  Cf. BALLON, supra note 22, §14.05[3] (“In many cases . . . the 
presumption of receipt should not necessarily apply merely because a 
communication was sent.”). 
 144.  See SSI Med. Servs., Inc. v. State Dept. of Human Servs., 685 A.2d 1, 6 n.1 
(N.J. 1996); see also BALLON, supra note 22, § 14.05[3] (“Not all of the assumptions 
underlying . . . evidentiary presumptions on terra firma . . . necessarily hold true 
online.”). 
 145.  See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 84.072(4) (West, Westlaw through 2012 
Reg. Sess.) (“A notice sent . . . to an electronic mail address . . . is presumed to 
have been received . . . .”); Am. Boat Co. I, 418 F.3d at 913 (“If [the court’s ECF] 
19
Bindman: The Spam Filter Ate My E-Mail: When Are Electronic Records Receiv
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013
  
1314 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:4 
presumed received when it enters the recipient’s system.146  
Proponents argue that a rebuttable presumption is necessary as a 
safeguard for the recipient.147  They assert that, since e-mail is less 
reliable than paper mail,148 a recipient should have an avenue for 
disputing receipt when a message is intercepted by a spam filter or 
otherwise fails to reach its destination.149  A rebuttable presumption 
would allow the recipient to present evidence that a spam filter 
intercepted the record.150 
First, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the plain language 
of UETA does not support a presumption of receipt.151  Under the 
“strong” presumption that a properly sent message is received, “the 
real issue is whether the sender properly mailed the notice, not 
 
entries indicated that an e-mail was sent and not returned as undeliverable, then 
receipt of that e-mail would be presumed.”); Letter from Cem Kaner, Attorney at 
Law, to Donald S. Clark, Sec’y, Fed. Trade Comm’n (Apr. 30, 1990), http://www 
.ftc.gov/bcp/icpw/comments/kaner.htm (“[T]he [UETA] receipt rule should 
involve a presumption . . . [and] the intended recipient should be able to rebut 
the presumption of receipt . . . .”).  But see CAL. R. CT. 2.259(a)(4) (West, Westlaw 
through Dec. 15, 2012) (“In the absence of the court’s confirmation of receipt and 
filing, there is no presumption that the court received and filed the document.”). 
 146.  Convention, supra note 32, art. 10, para. 2 (“An electronic 
communication is presumed to be capable of being retrieved by the [recipient] 
when it reaches the [recipient]’s electronic address.”); UNIFORM ELECTRONIC 
COMMERCE ACT, para. 23(2) (1999) (Can.), available at http://www.ulcc.ca 
/en/uniform-acts-en-gb-1/298-electronic-commerce-act/74-electronic-commerce            
-act?showall=&start=2 (“An electronic document is presumed to be received by the 
addressee, (a) when it enters an information system designated or used by the 
addressee . . . .”); see Smedinghoff, supra note 5 (“The UNCITRAL [Convention] 
approach may well be a good first step toward addressing the spam filter 
problem.”). 
 147.  See Letter from Cem Kaner to Donald S. Clark, supra note 145 (“A rule 
that states that e-mail is received when it [enters the recipient’s system] subjects 
the recipient to risk . . . .”). 
 148.  See Boss, supra note 57, at 336 n.299 (noting that one out of ten e-mails 
fails to reach its destination); Letter from Cem Kaner to Donald S. Clark, supra 
note 145 (“[E-mail providers] have no tradition of reliable delivery and no liability 
if they fail to deliver e-mail.”). 
 149.  See UNCITRAL, supra note 36, at 61; Letter from Cem Kaner to Donald S. 
Clark, supra note 145 (“The intended recipient should be able to rebut the 
presumption of receipt.”). 
 150.  See Am. Boat Co. I, 418 F.3d at 914 (ordering an evidentiary hearing to 
determine whether the presumption was rebutted); UNCITRAL, supra note 36, at 
62; Letter from Cem Kaner to Donald S. Clark, supra note 145 (providing 
examples of facts sufficient to rebut presumption of receipt). 
 151.  See Lord, supra note 50, at 58–59; see also Boss, supra note 57, at 336–37 & 
n.307 (“The question remains . . . of how to prove or even presume receipt.”); 
Smedinghoff, supra note 5 (arguing that UETA contains no presumption of 
receipt because it seeks to determine the “‘time’ of receipt”). 
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whether the intended recipient received it.”152  If this presumption 
were adopted, UETA’s “receipt” provisions would be surplusage 
because any properly sent message would be presumed received.153  
The “weak” presumption, which presumes a message to be received 
when it enters the recipient’s system, is similarly unsupported by 
UETA.154  UETA plainly states that a message is received when it 
enters the recipient’s system; once the message reaches that point, 
therefore, the presumption is meaningless.155  Further, UETA does 
not provide substantive rules of law; it serves only to validate 
electronic records.156  Thus, it would be inappropriate to “read in” a 
presumption of receipt.157 
Second, the relative unreliability of e-mail158 makes inadvisable 
a presumption of receipt.  The presumption of receipt of paper 
mail grew out of the tremendous reliability of the postal system, 
making it extremely unlikely that a properly dispatched letter 
would fail to be received.159  Consequently, the presumption 
benefits the sender when receipt is disputed.160  In contrast, an 
electronic record can encounter countless issues on its journey 
from sender to recipient.161  Given this unreliability, a presumption 
of receipt would provide the sender an undeserved benefit.162 
While courts have touted the reliability of e-mail in their 
decisions to support a presumption of receipt, these decisions have 
 
 152.  In re Schepps Food Stores, Inc., 152 B.R. 136, 139 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 
1993). 
 153.  See Id. at 139–40; UETA § 15(b) (1999). 
 154.  See, e.g., Convention, supra note 32, art. 10, para. 2. 
 155.  See UETA § 15(b). 
 156.  UETA Refs. & Annots. Prefatory Note (West, Westlaw through 2011 
annual meetings) (“[T]he substantive rules of contracts remain unaffected by 
UETA.”). 
 157.  See Lord, supra note 50, at 58–59. 
 158.  See supra note 148. 
 159.  See Ashley Wire Co. v. Ill. Steel Co., 45 N.E. 410, 413 (Ill. 1896). 
 160.  See, e.g., 57 THOMAS J. CZELUSTA ET AL., NEW YORK JURISPRUDENCE 2D 
EVIDENCE AND WITNESSES § 139 (2012), available at Westlaw NYJUR EVIDENCE 
(“[A] failure to show that the letter was correctly addressed will deprive the sender of 
the benefit of such presumption.” (emphasis added)). 
 161.  See supra text accompanying notes 100–105.  See Email Delivery Problems 
Explained, TOP WEB HOSTS, http://www.topwebhosts.org/articles/email-delivery     
-problems.php (last visited Feb. 20, 2013), for a list of potential e-mail delivery 
problems. 
 162.  Telephone Interview with R. David Whitaker, Counsel, Buckley Sandler 
LLP (Sept. 17, 2012) (all opinions, conclusions, or recommendations expressed 
are those of Mr. Whitaker and do not necessarily reflect the views of Buckley 
Sandler LLP). 
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been limited to receipt of ECF notices.163  ECF systems are likely 
more reliable than commercial e-mail systems because they are less 
likely to have delivery problems.164  Further, the court receives a 
“bounce-back” message when an ECF notice fails to reach the 
recipient’s system.165  Finally, attorneys have a duty to monitor the 
docket, making ECF notices a mere convenience.166  For these 
reasons, a court is unlikely to lend the same level of deference to a 
commercial e-mail system; however, a court could be justified in 
applying a presumption if a messaging system is as reliable as 
ECF.167 
In conclusion, a rebuttable presumption does provide the 
recipient an opportunity to dispute receipt.  However, a 
presumption is inadvisable because it opposes the plain language of 
UETA and ignores the relative unreliability of e- mail. 
B. E-SIGN Consumer Protection Provisions 
1. General Requirements and Limited Scope 
Next, this note will explore whether the E-SIGN consumer 
disclosure provision provides protection to consumers when a 
message sent by a business is intercepted by a spam filter.168  Unlike 
the Model Law and UETA, which apply generally to consumers 
without any consumer-specific rules,169 E-SIGN provides specific 
 
 163.  See, e.g., Am. Boat Co. v. Unknown Sunken Barge (Am. Boat Co. I), 418 
F.3d 910, 914 (8th Cir. 2005); Dempster v. Dempster, 404 F. Supp. 2d 445, 449 
(E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 164.  Am. Boat Co. v. Unknown Sunken Barge (Am. Boat Co. II), 567 F.3d 348, 
351 (8th Cir. 2009) (“The district court’s CM/ECF administrator . . . testified that 
the system had never experienced a glitch . . . [and that he had] ‘100 percent’ 
confidence that the Notice was received by [the attorney’s system].”). 
 165.  See id.; Moore v. United States, No. S 04-0423 FCD JFM, 2005 WL 
1984745, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2005), rev’d on other grounds, 262 F. App’x 828 
(9th Cir. 2008). 
 166.  Fox v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 389 F.3d 1291, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 2004) 
(“Regardless whether [the attorney] received the e-mail notice, he remained 
obligated to monitor the court’s docket.”); see also Moore, 2005 WL 1984745, at *5 
(“[The attorney] did not make an effort to obtain those communications through 
[the online docket] . . . .”). 
 167.  Cf., e.g., Kunz, supra note 11, at 400 (describing the “dedicated modem 
connections” of EDI communications). 
 168.  “‘[C]onsumer’ means an individual who obtains, through a transaction, 
products or services which are used primarily for personal, family, or household 
purposes . . . .”  15 U.S.C. § 7006(1) (2006). 
 169.  See UETA § 3 legis. n.4 (1999); UNCITRAL, supra note 21, at 24–25 
(“[T]here [is] no reason why situations involving consumers should be excluded 
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consumer protection.170  It should be noted, however, that this 
provision has a limited scope.171  Obviously, it protects only 
consumers; in addition, it applies only to records sent to consumers, 
not records sent by them.172  Further, E-SIGN mandates consumer 
consent only when notice in writing is legally required by state or 
federal law.173  Written notice is not legally required in most 
situations, including situations involving contract formation.174 
The E-SIGN consumer protection provision sets up redundant 
procedures to ensure that the consumer has consented to receiving 
electronic records and that the records can be reliably received.175  
In transactions governed by E-SIGN, any notice for which a writing 
is legally required may not be provided electronically until the 
consumer “has affirmatively consented to such use.”176  Among 
other requirements, the consumer must be provided a “clear and 
conspicuous statement” explaining the hardware and software 
requirements for accessing and retaining the records, the 
consumer’s right to obtain the record in paper form, and the 
procedure for withdrawing consent.177  After receiving this 
statement, the consumer must provide electronic consent in a way 
that demonstrates she can access the electronic documents.178  
Unless these requirements are met, an electronic record does not 
satisfy a business’s legal obligation to provide information to a 
consumer in writing.179 
Subsection (c)(1)(D) outlines situations in which the entity 
providing notice must reaffirm consent: 
 
from the scope of the Model Law . . . .”). 
 170.  See 15 U.S.C. § 7001(c). 
 171.  See Wittie & Winn, supra note 18, at 303–05 (“[T]he consumer consent 
provisions apply in limited circumstances.”). 
 172.  Id. at 304; see 15 U.S.C. § 7001(c)(1) (protecting electronic records 
“provided or made available to a consumer”). 
 173.  Wittie & Winn, supra note 18, at 304; see 15 U.S.C. § 7001(c)(1). 
 174.  Wittie & Winn, supra note 18, at 304.  In fact, even after a contract has 
been formed, lack of E-SIGN consent to receive records electronically does not 
invalidate that contract.  DOCUMENTING E-COMMERCE TRANSACTIONS, supra note 22, 
§ 4:3; see 15 U.S.C. § 7001(c)(3). 
 175.  BALLON, supra note 22, § 15.02[2][C]. 
 176.  15 U.S.C. § 7001(c)(1)(A). 
 177.  Id. § 7001(c)(1)(B)–(C). 
 178.  Id. § 7001(c)(1)(C)(ii).  Electronic consent or confirmation can be 
achieved by any means that “reasonably demonstrates” consent to accept 
electronic records.  Id.  For a list of best practices in obtaining electronic consent, 
see DOCUMENTING E-COMMERCE TRANSACTIONS, supra note 22, § 4:3. 
 179.  See 15 U.S.C. § 7001(c)(1). 
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[A]fter the consent of a consumer [has been obtained], if 
a change in the hardware or software requirements needed to 
access or retain electronic records creates a material risk 
that the consumer will not be able to access or retain a 
subsequent electronic record that was the subject of the 
consent, the person providing the electronic record 
[must]— 
(i) provide[] the consumer with a statement of (I) the 
revised hardware and software requirements for access to 
and retention of the electronic records, and (II) the right 
to withdraw consent . . . ; and 
(ii) again compl[y] with [the consent requirements 
described above].180 
Based on this provision, a business may be required to notify a 
consumer when its e-mail practices create a risk that a message will 
be intercepted by a spam filter.  However, two ambiguities in the 
provision make this conclusion uncertain.  First, what spam 
practices could constitute a “change in the hardware or software 
requirements needed to access . . . a subsequent electronic 
record”?181  Second, what spam practices could constitute a 
“material risk” that the record will not be received?182 
2. “Change in Requirements” and “Material Risk” 
When Congress debated E-SIGN in 2000, it anticipated that 
changes in technology would necessitate changes in the way 
electronic records are sent and received.183  For example, a business 
may undergo a system upgrade to implement newly installed 
hardware.184  A particular web browser may no longer be supported 
by the sender’s or recipient’s system.185  In essence, the redisclosure 
requirement could apply to any change, no matter how trivial, in 
the hardware and software requirements needed for the recipient 
to receive the sender’s message.186 
 
 180.  Id. § 7001(c)(1)(D) (emphasis added). 
 181.  See id. 
 182.  See id. 
 183.  See Robert A. Cook et al., The Electronic Signatures in Global and National 
Commerce Act—A Review of the Act’s Consumer Disclosure Requirements, 54 CONSUMER 
FIN. L.Q. REP. 315, 322 (2000). 
 184.  See BALLON, supra note 22, § 15.02[2][C]. 
 185.  See, e.g., Supported Browsers, GMAIL, support.google.com/mail/bin/answer 
.py?hl=en&answer=6557 (last visited Feb. 20, 2013). 
 186.  Telephone Interview with R. David Whitaker, supra note 162. 
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However, too broad of an interpretation could burden e-
commerce187 and annoy consumers who would be inundated by 
redisclosure notifications.188  Congress sought to protect consumer 
interests while limiting the burden on e-commerce.189  Therefore, 
E-SIGN was written to require redisclosure only when changes in 
hardware or software requirements pose a “material risk” to receipt 
by the consumer.190 
Congress did not, however, provide what constitutes a material 
risk.  A fact is material when “knowledge of the item would affect a 
person’s decision-making.”191  Therefore, a change in hardware or 
software requirements is material, requiring redisclosure under E-
SIGN, when knowledge of the change would affect the recipient’s 
decision to accept documents electronically. 
Some changes in required hardware or software would almost 
certainly not affect a recipient’s decision to continue receiving 
electronic documents.  For example, the release of a new version of 
a web browser does not create a material risk because upgrades are 
readily available.192  In fact, many electronic disclosure agreements 
state that only the most recent version of a web browser is 
supported.193  Conversely, a change may be material if the sender 
decides to no longer support any version of a popular web 
browser.194 
There are several business practices concerning spam filters 
that likely constitute material risks.  For example, a recipient’s 
 
 187.  See Wittie & Winn, supra note 18, at 307 (“[The E-SIGN consumer 
consent provisions] place a high compliance burden on businesses.”). 
 188.  See id. (“[C]onsumers . . . will need to wade through lengthy and perhaps 
repetitive consent forms in order to do business electronically.”). 
 189.  See 15 U.S.C. § 7005(b) (2006) (authorizing an evaluation of the burdens 
that E-SIGN imposes on e-commerce); Cook et al., supra note 183, at 316 
(asserting that Congress sought to provide consumer protections while limiting 
burdens to e-commerce); see also Fed. Trade Comm’n & Dep’t of Commerce, E-
SIGN: The Consumer Consent Provision in Section 101(c)(1)(C)(ii), FED. TRADE 
COMMISSION (June 2001), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/06/esign7.htm (reporting 
on the benefits and burdens that E-SIGN imposes on e-commerce). 
 190.  15 U.S.C. § 7001(c)(1)(D). 
 191.  E.g., Huston v. Procter & Gamble Paper Prods. Corp., 568 F.3d 100, 107 
(3d Cir. 2009) (quoting BLACKS’ LAW DICTIONARY 998 (8th ed. 2004)); In re AFI 
Holding, Inc., 530 F.3d 832, 846 (9th Cir. 2008) (same). 
 192.  Telephone Interview with R. David Whitaker, supra note 162; see, e.g., 
Internet Explorer 9 Delivery Through Automatic Updates, MICROSOFT, http://technet 
.microsoft.com/en-us/ie/gg615599.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2013).  
 193.  Telephone Interview with R. David Whitaker, supra note 162. 
 194.  See, e.g., The Associated Press, AOL to End Support of Netscape Navigator, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2007, at C8. 
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decision to accept electronic documents would certainly be 
affected if the sender increased the “spam score” of its electronic 
records195 or used a server relay that is listed on several RBLs.196  It is 
less clear whether a recipient’s decision would be affected if the 
sender begins to send more bulk e-mails.197 
Statements from congressional debates confirm that E-SIGN 
intends to place the burden of consent requirements on the 
sender: 
Most individuals lack the technological sophistication to 
know the exact technical specifications of their computer 
equipment and software.  It is appropriate to require 
companies to establish an “electronic connection” with 
their customers in order to provide assurance that the 
consumer will be able to access the information in the 
electronic form in which it will be sent.198 
One could argue that this “electronic connection” is severed when 
a sender acts in a way that greatly increases the chance of its 
electronic records being intercepted by a spam filter.  It is likely, 
therefore, that a sender who does so is required to reestablish 
consent from the consumer. 
In conclusion, while the E-SIGN consumer disclosure 
provision may provide consumer protection from businesses 
engaged in negligent or sharp practices, its limited scope makes it 
inapplicable in a majority of situations. 
C. Accountability Test 
The third spam filter solution accounts for each party’s ability 
to prevent a spam filter from intercepting an electronic record.  It 
holds the sender responsible if its message is likely to be 
intercepted by a spam filter, and it holds the recipient responsible 
if the recipient maintains an unreasonable spam filter or fails to 
check for filtered messages in a junk mail folder.199  Rather than 
 
 195.  See supra text accompanying notes 92–95. 
 196.  See supra text accompanying notes 84–87. 
 197.  A sender of bulk e-mails is more likely to be included on an RBL.  
Telephone Interview with Michael Fleming, supra note 52. 
 198.  146 CONG. REC. S5230 (daily ed. June 15, 2000) (statement of Sens. 
Hollings, Wyden, & Sarbanes); see also 146 CONG. REC. H4360 (daily ed. June 14, 
2000) (statement of Rep. Tauzin) (“[T]he provisions regarding consent afford 
consumers with the greatest possible safeguards against fraud imaginable.”). 
 199.  Cf. Smedinghoff, supra note 5 (“If the intended recipient does not 
receive a message because the message is quarantined or deleted by a spam filter, 
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creating a “bright-line rule,” this test is necessarily fact-specific.200  
For example, while the term “Viagra” is likely to raise the spam 
score of a message,201 that term may be appropriate if the sender is 
a pharmaceutical company. 
Late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century cases involving 
mistaken telegraph transmissions provide historical support for the 
accountability test.  These cases generally stated that a telegram 
recipient could not be held accountable for acting upon an 
erroneous message when there was no reason for the recipient to 
doubt the accuracy of the message,202 even if the telegram 
contradicted previous correspondence.203  The telegraph test was 
fact-specific: the recipient could not be penalized for relying on a 
message that “was not unintelligible . . . [or] couched in 
extraordinary or unusual language.”204  If, however, the recipient 
acted on a message that he should reasonably have known 
contained errors, then the recipient was held accountable for any 
negative effect.205 
UETA uses a similar test to determine the effect of an error in 
transmission.206  If both parties have agreed to use a security 
procedure to detect errors in transmission, and an error occurs due 
to one party’s failure to conform to the procedure, the conforming 
party can avoid any negative effect caused by the error.207  The 
 
has the sender failed to fulfill a legal obligation to deliver information, or has the 
recipient assumed the risk?”). 
 200.  See Campbell v. Gen. Dynamics Gov’t Sys. Corp., 407 F.3d 546, 554 (1st 
Cir. 2005) (using a “fact-dependent” test to determine whether appropriate notice 
was given); Reece v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d 839, 843 (5th Cir. 1996) 
(declining to establish a “bright-line rule” regarding who is authorized to receive 
service of process), abrogated in part by Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe 
Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344 (1999). 
 201.  See Bowles et al., supra note 81, at 9. 
 202.  See, e.g., McCarty v. W. Union Tel. Co., 91 S.W. 976, 977 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1906); W. Union Tel. Co. v. Beals, 76 N.W. 903, 905 (Neb. 1898); W. Union Tel. 
Co. v. Edsall, 12 S.W. 41, 43 (Tex. 1889). 
 203.  See Henry v. W. Union. Tel. Co., 131 P. 812, 813 (Wash. 1913) (holding 
that the recipient could reasonably have assumed that his purchasing agent had 
been successful in reducing the offer). 
 204.  Beals, 76 N.W. at 905. 
 205.  See, e.g., W. Union Tel. Co. v. Wright, 18 Ill. App. 337, 340 (1885) 
(finding the recipient contributorily negligent for acting on an erroneous 
telegram after being informed of the mistake); Hart v. Direct U.S. Cable Co., 86 
N.Y. 633, 633–34 (1881) (holding that the recipient “took the risk” of interpreting 
a message that contained “unintelligible jargon”). 
 206.  See UETA § 10 (1999). 
 207.  Id. § 10(1). 
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provision “operates against the non-conforming party, i.e., the party 
in the best position to have avoided the change or error, regardless of 
whether that person is the sender or recipient.”208  Similarly, the 
accountability test seeks to hold responsible the party in the best 
position to avoid interception by a spam filter.209 
The following sections will examine the factors controlled by 
the sender and the recipient and argue that each party should be 
responsible for the consequences of its actions concerning those 
factors. 
1. Factors Controlled by the Sender 
The sender has control over the content and dispatch of an 
electronic record.  As shown above, the sender’s deliberate, 
reckless, or negligent actions can affect whether a message is likely 
to be intercepted by a spam filter.210  If a message is filtered before 
entering the recipient’s system, the sender’s actions are 
inconsequential because the message has failed to be received 
anyway.211  But what if the message is filtered after it enters the 
recipient’s system?  According to the language of UETA, it would 
appear that the message was received and the recipient “assumed 
the risk” of using a spam filter.212  However, two UETA provisions 
may potentially protect a recipient from a sender’s sharp or 
negligent practices.  First, an electronic record must be “addressed 
properly.”213  Second, the record must be “in a form capable of 
being processed” by the recipient’s system.214 
a. “Addressed Properly” 
First, an electronic record must be “addressed properly” or 
“otherwise directed properly” to the recipient’s system.215  The 
message must contain “specific information which will direct the 
 
 208.  Id. § 10 cmt. 2 (emphasis added). 
 209.  See id. 
 210.  See supra notes 84–87 & 92–95. 
 211.  UETA § 15(b).  But see infra Part IV.C.2 (suggesting a broader definition 
of the recipient’s system). 
 212.  Smedinghoff, supra note 5, at 2; see also UETA § 15(b) (stating that an 
electronic record is received when it enters the recipient’s processing system). 
 213.  UETA § 15(a)(1). 
 214.  Id. § 15(a)(2).  An electronic record must also be “in a form capable of 
being processed” at the time of receipt.  Id. § 15(b)(2). 
 215.  Id. § 15(a)(1). 
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record to the intended recipient.”216  An improperly addressed 
message has not been sent.217  Although a message may be received 
even if not properly sent,218 an improper address affects receipt 
because the message is less likely to enter the recipient’s system and 
the recipient is less likely to be “able to retrieve the electronic 
record.”219 
Obviously, the sender has not properly addressed a message in 
which the recipient’s electronic address is incorrect.220  In addition, 
a message may not be properly addressed when the sender’s 
electronic practices increase the likelihood of the sender being 
“blacklisted,” because inclusion on an RBL greatly decreases the 
chance that the message will be “direct[ed] . . . to the intended 
recipient.”221  Several factors affect a sender’s likelihood of being 
blacklisted, including the reputation of the sender’s domain name 
and the reputation of the system or server relays used by the 
sender.222  If sending messages in bulk, a sender is more likely to be 
blacklisted if the recipient list is “opt-out” rather than “opt-in”223 or 
if the sender fails to include an “opt-out” statement.224 
While courts have not published opinions on what constitutes 
a “properly addressed” electronic record under UETA, ample case 
law exists relating to paper records: 
[A] “proper” address would be “characterized by 
appropriateness or suitability” for its intended purpose.  
The purpose of an address is to supply information for 
delivery of mail to its intended destination. Hence, an 
address containing errors inconsequential to delivery is 
still proper. 
. . . Where an address, ex ante, enables delivery to the 
intended destination, then that address is proper and any 
 
 216.  Id. § 15 cmt. 2.  Mass sending, as in the case of bulk messages, is covered 
as long as the messages are sent to individuals rather than as a “general broadcast 
message.”  Id. 
 217.  Id. § 15(a). 
 218.  See id. § 15(b) (not requiring proper dispatch as a precursor to receipt). 
 219.  Id. § 15(b)(1). 
 220.  See id. § 15(a)(1) (requiring that the sender direct the message to a 
system designated by the recipient or a system used by the recipient for similar 
messages). 
 221.  Telephone Interview with Michael Fleming, supra note 52; see UETA § 15 
(a)(1), cmt. 2. 
 222.  Telephone Interview with Michael Fleming, supra note 52. 
 223.  RBLs tend to be more skeptical of “opt-out” lists because the recipient 
has not affirmatively consented to being included on the list.  Id. 
 224.  Id. 
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error is inconsequential.225 
An error is inconsequential when it is “so minor that it would not 
prevent delivery of the notice.”226  Thus, an address is improper if 
an error would cause a message to fail to reach its destination.227 
Using this definition, courts have generally held that an 
incorrect zip code is an inconsequential error and does not result 
in an improper address.228  A zip code “facilitate[s] the delivery” of 
mail but is not a necessary part of the address.229  If the letter 
contains the correct name and address, an incorrect zip code is 
unlikely to prevent delivery or cause delay, especially when the 
error is minor.230  In contrast, a letter with an incorrect address and 
zip code is improperly addressed.231 
Blacklisting factors are more similar to an incorrect name or 
address than an incorrect zip code.  While an incorrect zip code 
usually is inconsequential and a mere inconvenience to postal 
workers,232 blacklisting factors are more than inconvenient because 
they can prevent a message from being delivered at all.233  An 
absence of blacklisting factors is a necessary part of the sender’s 
message and does more than merely “facilitate the delivery.”234 
Therefore, a recipient may be protected from a sender’s sharp 
or negligent practices if the sender engages in blacklisting factors 
 
 225.  Santoro v. Principi, 274 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citation 
omitted); see, e.g., Busquets-Ivars v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(determining whether a piece of mail was “properly directed”); Judkins v. 
Davenport, 59 S.W.3d 689, 690–91 (Tex. App. 2000) (same). 
 226.  Pickering v. Comm’r, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 2152, at *2 (1998). 
 227.  See Santoro, 274 F.3d at 1370; Pickering, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 2152, at *2. 
 228.  See, e.g., Price v. Comm’r, 76 T.C. 389, 392–93 (1981); Judkins, 59 S.W.3d 
at 691.  But see Busquets-Ivars, 333 F.3d at 1010 (“The INS fails to [properly send the 
letter] because the zip code used was incorrect.”). 
 229.  Judkins, 59 S.W.3d at 691; see Pickering, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 2152, at *2 
(“[T]he ZIP code number . . . is for the convenience of the Postal Service and is 
helpful to ensure prompt delivery.” (quoting Watkins v. Comm’r, 63 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 1710 (1992))); Price, 76 T.C. at 392 (“The use of zip codes is for the 
convenience of the Postal Service . . . .”). 
 230.  Pickering, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 2152, at *3 (unlikely to prevent delivery); 
Smetanka v. Comm’r, 74 T.C. 715, 719 (1980) (unlikely to cause delay). 
 231.  Int’l Television Film Prod., Inc. v. Comm’r, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 1049, 1049 
(1983). 
 232.  See Pickering, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 2152, at *2 (“[T]he ZIP code number . . . 
is for the convenience of the Postal Service . . . .” (quoting Watkins, 63 T.C.M. 
(CCH) at 1710 (1992))). 
 233.  Id.; see also Santoro v. Principi, 274 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
(“Where an address . . . enables delivery to the intended destination, then that 
address is proper and any error is inconsequential.”). 
 234.  See Judkins, 59 S.W.3d at 691. 
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that cause the message to be improperly addressed.  In that case, 
the sender should be responsible for nonreceipt because the 
sender was in the best position to prevent the filter from 
intercepting the message. 
b. “Form Capable of Being Processed” 
Second, an electronic record must be “in a form capable of 
being processed by [the recipient’s] system” at the time of sending 
and at the time of receipt.235  While UETA does not address the 
legal effectiveness of electronic records,236 this provision implicitly 
involves the content of the message.  The sender has sole control 
over the content of the message.  Specifically, she has the ability to 
avoid practices that would tend to raise the message’s “spam 
score.”237  If a message has a high spam score, it may not be “in a 
form capable of being processed” by the recipient’s system because 
the message is likely to never reach the recipient’s inbox.238 
While courts have not examined the content of electronic 
records for factors relating to a message’s “spam score,” e-mail 
content has been inspected for factors relating to inconspicuous 
notice.  In Campbell v. General Dynamics Government Systems Corp.,239 
an employer initiated a new policy by which all unresolved disputes 
would be subject to mandatory arbitration.240  The employees were 
notified of the new policy via e-mail.241  Neither the subject heading 
nor the introductory paragraphs of the e-mail gave any indication 
that the message was of any importance.242  While subsequent 
paragraphs explained that unresolved disputes would now be 
settled by arbitration, the e-mail did not notify employees that the 
new policy eliminated the right to resolve disputes in a judicial 
forum, nor did the e-mail mention that continuation of 
employment constituted acceptance of the policy’s terms.243  This 
information was available in the policy itself; however, the policy 
 
 235.  UETA § 15(a)(2), (b)(2) (1999). 
 236.  See id. § 15 cmt. 1. 
 237.  Telephone Interview with Michael Fleming, supra note 52; see supra Part 
III.B. 
 238.  See UETA § 15(a)(2), (b)(2). 
 239.  407 F.3d 546 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 240.  Id. at 547. 
 241.  Id. at 547–48. 
 242.  Campbell v. Gen. Dynamics Gov’t Sys. Corp., 321 F. Supp. 2d 142, 144 
(D. Mass. 2004), aff’d, 407 F.3d 546 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 243.  Campbell, 407 F.3d at 548. 
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was not attached to the e-mail.244  To access the policy, employees 
had to follow a hyperlink that led to a page on the company’s 
intranet site.245  The e-mail did not require a response from 
employees acknowledging receipt or their understanding of the 
new policy.246 
When an employee sought judicial review of his termination 
over a year later, the company asserted that the employee’s dispute 
should be resolved through arbitration as described by the policy.247  
Although the employee conceded that the e-mail technically was 
“received,”248 he argued that the arbitration agreement was not 
binding because the content of the e-mail belied the importance of 
the subject matter—the renouncement of an important legal 
right.249 
The court relied on the content of the e-mail in determining 
that the message did not provide fair warning to the employee.250  
The court found that the e-mail “undersold the significance of the 
Policy” because neither the subject heading nor the text put the 
recipient on notice “that arbitration was to become mandatory and 
thereby extinguish an employee’s access to a judicial forum as a 
means for dispute resolution.”251  The court also examined the 
“tone and choice of phrase[s]” within the e-mail and found them to 
be lacking.252  Although the policy itself was written in “clear, 
contractual language,” the e-mail “downplay[ed] the obligations set 
forth in the Policy.”253  It did not explicitly state that the policy 
would eliminate an employee’s right to seek judicial review and 
that the policy was legally binding if the recipient continued 
employment.254  To paraphrase using the language of UETA, the e-
mail was not “in a form capable of being processed” by the recipient 
 
 244.  Id. 
 245.  Id. 
 246.  Id. 
 247.  Id. at 549. 
 248.  Id. at 548–49 (presenting evidence that e-mail was “opened . . . two 
minutes after it was sent” but not that it was read). 
 249.  See id. at 549 (“[T]he company’s e-mail communication had failed to give 
the plaintiff adequate notice that the Policy was intended to form a binding 
agreement to arbitrate.”). 
 250.  Id. at 557. 
 251.  Id. at 558. 
 252.  Id. at 557. 
 253.  Id. 
 254.  Id. at 557–58. 
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because it did not provide him with notice of its importance.255 
Similarly, an electronic record with spam characteristics is not 
“in a form capable of being processed” by the recipient’s system 
because it resembles spam rather than an important 
communication.256  By using language and conventions that raise an 
electronic record’s “spam score,” a sender may “trick” the spam 
filter into believing that a message is unimportant and potentially 
harmful.257  As in Campbell, the “tone and choice of phrases” used in 
such a message “downplay” the message’s importance because the 
recipient’s filter is likely to misinterpret the message and filter it 
before it reaches the recipient’s inbox.258  A message with a high 
spam score may fail to put the spam filter on notice that the 
message should be delivered to the inbox rather than sent to the 
junk mail folder (or deleted altogether).259 
In conclusion, a sender who deliberately or negligently creates 
a message with a high spam score may fail to send a message “in a 
form capable of being processed” by the recipient’s system; 
therefore, the message is neither sent nor received.260  If so, the 
sender should be responsible for the recipient’s lack of awareness 
of the message because the sender was in the best position to 
prevent the spam filter from intercepting the message. 
2. Factors Controlled by the Recipient 
The recipient has no influence over the content and dispatch 
of an electronic record; thus, the factors under its control are more 
limited than those of the sender.  However, the recipient does 
control the location of its spam filters and the intensity of those 
filters.261  If an overactive spam filter within the recipient’s system 
incorrectly intercepts a legitimate message (i.e., a message without 
 
 255.  See UETA § 15(a), (b) (1999). 
 256.  See id. § 15(b). 
 257.  See Campbell, 407 F.3d at 557 (“[T]he e-mail announcement . . . 
downplay[ed] the obligations set forth in the [p]olicy.”). 
 258.  Id. at 557–58. 
 259.  See id. at 557 (“[T]he e-mail communication, in and of itself, was not 
enough to put a reasonable employee on inquiry notice of an alteration to the 
contractual aspects of the employment relationship.”); cf. Whitaker, supra note 47, 
at 24–25 (noting that the Federal Trade Commission requires the content of 
online notices to be “reasonably understandable and designed to call attention to 
the information that must be disclosed.”). 
 260.  See UETA § 15(a), (b). 
 261.  See Bowles et al., supra note 81, at 13 (“[S]pam filters . . . can be 
configured in various ways . . . .”). 
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the defects described in Part IV.C.1), the message is likely received 
because it already entered the system.262  In such a situation, the 
recipient has the responsibility to check the junk mail folder or be 
held responsible for receipt of the message.263  But what if the filter 
is located outside of the recipient’s system or is maintained by a 
third party employed by the recipient? 
According to the language of UETA, an electronic record is 
not received until it enters the recipient’s “information processing 
system,”264 which is defined as “an electronic system for creating, 
generating, sending, receiving, storing, displaying, or processing 
information.”265  The UETA comments provide that the “key 
aspect” of an information processing system is that the user is able 
to access it.266  This suggests that an information processing system, 
viewed broadly, may encompass more than the system itself, so long 
as the user retains access.267 
Moreover, the UETA comments assert that the UETA 
definition of “information processing system” is consistent with the 
Model Law’s definition of “information system.”268  The Model Law 
Guide to Enactment provides: “The definition of ‘information system’ 
is intended to cover the entire range of technical means used for 
transmitting, receiving and storing information.”269  Using this 
broader definition, a recipient would likely be held responsible for 
spam filters under its control, even if outside of the recipient’s 
system, because the filters are within the recipient’s “entire range” 
of access.270 
Additionally, an analogy to paper mail suggests that a broad 
definition of the recipient’s system likely includes spam filters 
operated by a third-party agent of the recipient.  Courts have 
universally held that process is received by a corporation when it is 
acquired by an agent authorized to receive such documents.271  
 
 262.  See UETA § 15(b)(1). 
 263.  Telephone Interview with Michael Fleming, supra note 52. 
 264.  UETA § 15(b)(1). 
 265.  Id. § 2(11). 
 266.  Id. § 2 cmt. 9. 
 267.  Telephone Interview with Michael Fleming, supra note 52; see UETA § 2 
cmt. 9. 
 268.  UETA § 2 cmt. 9; see Model Law, supra note 32, art. 2(f) (providing an 
almost identical definition). 
 269.  UNCITRAL, supra note 21, at 29 (emphasis added). 
 270.  Telephone Interview with Michael Fleming, supra note 52; see 
UNCITRAL, supra note 21, at 29. 
 271.  Tech Hills II Assocs. v. Phx. Home Life Mut. Ins. Co., 5 F.3d 963, 968 
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Since the agent has specifically been chosen by the corporation to 
receive process, courts reason that receipt occurs when the agent 
receives the process rather than when the process actually comes 
into the hands of the corporation.272  Courts fear that establishing 
receipt as the time the corporation receives the process would 
result in “lost homework” excuses where the corporation asserts it 
did not receive the process until long after it had been received by 
the agent.273 
Although there is no “bright-line rule” regarding who is 
authorized to receive process, courts have found service of process 
to be sufficient when received by agents and employees who are 
“responsible and sufficiently familiar with legal matters” and who 
can “forward the pleading to the proper individual or department 
within the company.”274  Thus, service to a “run-of-the-mill 
corporate employee”275 or to a security guard276 would not result in 
receipt, while service to a company’s receptionist, local store 
manager, or CEO would result in receipt.277  Similarly, a notice is 
received under the Revised U.C.C. when “it is duly delivered . . . at 
the place of business through which the contract was made or at 
another location held out by that person as the place for receipt of such 
communications.”278 
A third-party spam filter should be regarded as a “receptionist” 
rather than a “security guard.”  The filter has been “chosen” by the 
recipient (or the recipient’s system manager) and is “authorized to 
 
(6th Cir. 1993); Barr v. Zurich Ins. Co., 985 F. Supp. 701, 702 (S.D. Tex. 1997); see 
Reece v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d 839, 843–44 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[Sending the 
pleading to the corporation’s CEO] is a perfectly sensible way to notify a 
responsible individual within the corporation . . . .”); Roe v. O’Donohue, 38 F.3d 
298, 304 (7th Cir. 1994); Edling v. IMI Sys., Inc., No. CIV.A. 301CV2817-M, 2002 
WL 240135, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 15, 2002).  Although Murphy Brothers, Inc. v. 
Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344 (1999), repealed the so-called “receipt 
rule” and disallowed informal service of process via fax or photocopy, Murphy 
Brothers does not suggest that formal service upon an authorized agent is invalid.  
Edling, 2002 WL 240135, at *2. 
 272.  See Barr, 985 F. Supp. at 703 (“Registered agents exist to receive 
process . . . .  Defendant chose this one.”). 
 273.  Edling, 2002 WL 240135, at *2. 
 274.  Reece, 98 F.3d at 843. 
 275.  Barr, 985 F. Supp. at 703. 
 276.  Tech Hills II, 5 F.3d at 968. 
 277.  Reece, 98 F.3d at 843–44 (CEO); Roe v. O’Donohue, 38 F.3d 298, 304 (7th 
Cir. 1994) (receptionist); Allison v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 159 F. Supp. 550, 
551–52 (D.N.H. 1957) (store manager). 
 278.  U.C.C. § 1-202(e) (2001) (emphasis added). 
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accept” and inspect all of the recipient’s messages.279  Like an agent 
authorized to receive process, a third-party filter has the 
capability—and responsibility—to forward the message to the 
appropriate individual.280  Moreover, the recipient certainly has 
identified the third-party spam filter as a “place for receipt” of 
electronic records because all records must pass through the filter 
before entering the recipient’s system.281 
If messages could be reviewed by a third-party filter prior to 
receipt, a recipient could engage in a “lost homework” excuse and 
potentially avoid receipt by preventing the message from entering 
her system.282  Review prior to receipt is contrary to the plan 
language of UETA because awareness of a message is not a 
precursor to receipt.283  Further, allowing such review would result 
in a media-specific rule (which UETA has expressly avoided) 
because it would allow agents to receive traditional mail but not 
electronic mail.284 
Therefore, barring any sharp or negligent practices on the 
part of the sender, recipients should be responsible for the actions 
of their spam filters, even if the filter is located outside of the 
recipient’s system or operated by a third-party agent of the 
recipient.  If a message is incorrectly filtered by an overactive spam 
filter within the recipient’s control, the recipient has a 
responsibility to check her junk mail folder or otherwise be held 
responsible for receipt of the message. 
3. Application to Hypotheticals 
Application of the accountability test to the hypotheticals in 
Part I demonstrates that the test is a reasonable and balanced 
approach.285  In “Awaiting Acceptance,” an e-mail was intercepted 
 
 279.  See Tech Hills II, 5 F.3d at 968; Barr, 985 F. Supp. at 702–03. 
 280.  See Reece, 98 F.3d at 843–44 (“[T]his method of delivery is a perfectly 
sensible way to notify a responsible individual . . . .”). 
 281.  See U.C.C. § 1-202(e). 
 282.  See Edling v. IMI Sys., Inc., No. CIV.A. 301CV2817-M, 2002 WL 240135, at 
*2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 15, 2002); cf. Snijders, supra note 50, at 80 (arguing in favor of 
a receipt rule that does not require the recipient to view the message). 
 283.  See UETA § 15(e) (1999). 
 284.  See UETA Refs. & Annots. Prefatory Note B (West, Westlaw through 2011 
annual meetings) (noting that the Act merely seeks to remove “biases and 
barriers” so that existing law will apply to an electronic context). 
 285.  Additionally, unlike the E-SIGN consumer protection provision, the 
accountability test can apply to any transaction governed by UETA.  Compare 15 
U.S.C. § 7001(c) (2006) (applying only where a writing is legally required), with 
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due to an overactive spam filter operated by the recipient’s agent.286  
Although the filter was located outside of the recipient’s system, it 
was still under the recipient’s control; therefore, the e-mail was 
received.287  In “Rotten Recall,” the sender deliberately doctored an 
e-mail to ensure that it would be intercepted by a spam filter.288  
The e-mail was not “in a form capable of being processed” by the 
recipient’s system.289  Since the sender had control over the e-mail’s 
content, the e-mail was not received, even though the message may 
technically have entered the recipient’s system.290  In contrast, the 
sender in “Flower Fanatic” did not increase the e-mail’s “spam 
score.”291  Since the recipient had control over, and in fact created, 
the rule that rerouted the e-mail to a separate folder, the e-mail was 
received.292 
Moreover, the accountability test conforms to the underlying 
policies of UETA.293  Requiring parties to take responsibility for the 
factors under their control will result in more certainty as to how 
UETA is applied.294  The accountability test is a “reasonable 
practice” because it encourages each party to take responsibility for 
its practices and protects parties from sharp or negligent 
practices.295  Finally, protecting recipients from unscrupulous 
senders will “promote public confidence in the validity, integrity 
and reliability of electronic commerce.”296 
V. CONCLUSION 
None of the electronic communication laws discussed in this 
note command a party to do business electronically.297  If a party 
voluntarily elects to benefit from e-commerce, she should be 
responsible for having some understanding of the required 
 
UETA § 5(b) (applying where parties have “agreed to conduct transactions by 
electronic means”). 
 286.  See supra text accompanying note 1. 
 287.  See supra Part IV.C.2. 
 288.  See supra text accompanying note 2. 
 289.  See UETA § 15(a)–(b). 
 290.  See supra Part IV.C.1.b. 
 291.  See supra text accompanying note 3. 
 292.  See supra Part IV.C.2. 
 293.  See UETA § 6. 
 294.  See id. § 6 cmt. 1(b). 
 295.  See id. § 6(2). 
 296.  Id. § 6 cmt. 1(f). 
 297.  See 15 U.S.C. § 7001(b)(2) (2006); Convention, supra note 32, art. 8, 
para. 2; UCITA § 107(b) (2002); UETA § 5(a). 
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technology.  In the paper world, a sender could not argue that a 
letter with the incorrect address was properly sent.298  A recipient 
could not argue that a letter was not received because she did not 
know where the mailroom was. 
In the electronic world, it should be the same.  While senders 
and recipients should be protected from unfair practices, they must 
have a general understanding of the system in which they conduct 
business.  This includes taking responsibility of the dispatch and 
receipt factors under each party’s control.  While understanding 
complex electronic communication processes may involve a sharp 
learning curve, that is simply “the cost of doing e-business.” 
 
 
 298.  See, e.g., Int’l Television Film Prod., Inc. v. Comm’r, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 
1049 (1983). 
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